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Network-Bonding Actions, Quality of Ties, and Channel Member Collaboration: 




We aim to deepen our understanding of the processes through which network-bonding 
actions affect channel member collaboration in the small firm context. We develop a 
framework to highlight the mediating roles of quality of ties and moderating role of control 
mechanisms in such processes. We test our framework using the quantitative method, by 
analysing survey from 385 UK-based small firms. We find that social interaction tends to 
affect operation synchronization via goal congruence, while affects intelligence generation 
via relational embeddedness. Furthermore, contractual governance has a negative moderating 
effect on the relationship between social interaction and goal congruence.  
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Firms increasingly rely on resources not only within but also outside their boundaries 
in order to deal with uncertain business environments (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Kale et al., 
2000). Accessing and attaining external resources often involves establishing a collaborative 
relationship with business partners. Echoing this perspective, scholars highlight that channel 
member collaboration (CMC) plays a positive role in fostering firms’ competitiveness 
(Simatupang and Sridharan, 2005) and attempt to explore how firms can deliberately engage 
in activities designed to nurture CMC (e.g. Cao and Zhang, 2013; Dutta and Hora, 2017; 
Sukwadi et al., 2013). The current research explores one particular type of antecedent of 
CMC: network-bonding actions (NBAs). NBAs represent a range of socializing actions, such 
as social interaction (Carey et al., 2011; Villena et al., 2011), that aim to generate meaningful 
links among the channel members. In a highly uncertain business environment, NBAs emerge 
as an important strategic option to enable firms to coordinate exchange and cooperation 
through the use of informal, relational mechanisms (Bernardes, 2010; Cousins et al., 2006).  
Through frequent, in-depth socializing with their channel members, firms can enhance 
both the communication and collaboration between themselves and their channel members 
(see the literature overview in Table 1). The extent literature highlights the direct link 
between various types of NBAs and the different types of CMC (Table 1). Villena et al. 
(2011) go further, suggesting that a curvilinear relationship (inverted-U shape) exists between 
social interaction and CMC performance outcomes. Nevertheless, a direct NBAs-CMC 
linkage lacks face validity and fails to explain the importance of the various possible 
intermediate mechanisms existing between the two. Recently, scholars have attempted to 
address this under-explored area (e.g. Bernardes, 2010; Chang et al., 2012; Kim, 2014). 
Although this research line has generated powerful, enduring theoretical insights, limited 
efforts have centred on differentiating the roles of various intermediate mechanisms in 
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connecting NBAs with specific CMC. Furthermore, only Yan and Dooley (2013) and Carey 
et al. (2011) examine the presence of contingency factors regarding the NBAs-CMC link. 
The question of whether a contingency factor can affect NBAs’ impact differently in different 
situations remains under-examined. Understanding exactly under which conditions NBAs 
affect different CMC is critical for managers charged with designing networking strategies to 
target specific CMC. 
“Insert Table 1 about here”  
Furthermore, this research focuses on understanding the relationship between NBAs 
and CMC in a small firm setting. We define a “small firm” as firms with fewer than 50 
employees and an annual turnover of less than £10 million (Ward and Rhodes, 2014)
1
. 
According to UK business statistics in 2017, there were roughly 5.65 million small firms in 
the UK, making up 99% of all businesses (Rhodes, 2017). Although important to all firms, 
CMC is especially crucial for small firms because such collaboration (Matopoulos et al., 
2007) mitigates their liability of smallness. Unlike large organizations (with an abundance of 
resources), that are able to deal with uncertainty in the marketplace alone, small firms (with 
limited resources) are more likely to survive when facing such uncertainty if they establish 
collaborative relationships with other channel members (Brettel et al., 2011; Wynarczyk and 
Watson, 2005). Despite recognizing that small firms often leverage NBAs tactics to develop 
their competitive business strategy (Elfring and Hulsink, 2003; Gnyawali and Park, 2009), 
surprisingly, no studies have examined the NBAs-CMC association in the small firm context 
(Table 1). This contextualization is important in establishing the boundary conditions for our 
theory. Our findings can offer specific practical implications for small firm managers.  
“Insert Figure 1 about here” 
                                                 
1
 We use the definition of ‘small firm’ employed in the UK, as this research analyzes survey data obtained from 
UK-based small firms.  
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To address these gaps, we build on the social network theory to develop a conceptual 
framework (Figure 1). Specifically, we differentiate two new types of CMC - operation 
synchronization and intelligence generation. We suggest that small firms can engage in social 
interaction (a type of NBA) to build operation synchronization and intelligence generation. 
We also identify two salient types of tie quality (goal congruence and relational 
embeddedness), which mediate the relationship between social interaction and the two types 
of CMC differently. Furthermore, we propose contractual governance as a moderator that 
affects the strength of the relationship between social interaction and the quality of ties. We 
test our framework by employing survey data on 385 small firms in the UK. In general, our 
framework aims to explore the processes through which NBAs affect CMC in the small firm 
context and contribute to the NBAs-CMC association literature in several ways. First, our 
study sheds new light on this literature by examining the process whereby different types of 
tie quality mediate the impacts of social interaction on different types of CMC. Second, the 
study enriches the literature by specifying the contingent role of contractual governance in 
affecting the strength of the relationship between social interaction and the quality of ties. 
Finally, this study extends the literature into the new research context of small firms’ supply 
chain management. In the next section, we will discuss how we draw on social network 
theory to identify and define the central constructs of our framework. 
 
Theoretical Background and Constructs 
We anchor our study in social network theory. Social network theory aims to explain 
how firms are embedded in various social networks and the formation of social connections 
allows them to produce better economic outcomes via cooperation (Granovetter, 1985; Kim, 
2014). The primary focus of social network theory is that economic actions are deeply 
embedded in the networks of interfirm relations (Kim, 2014; Uzzi, 1997). In accordance with 
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this premise, social network theory expects firms to collaborate with each another and gain 
access to scarce resources through their network relations (Bernardes, 2010; Gulati et al., 
2000). For small firms, the establishment of business cooperation emerges as an important 
strategic option that may enable small firms to secure resources and deal with uncertain 
environments, because small firms’ own resources may be insufficient to allow them to cope 
with the rapid changes occurring in the marketplace alone (Cooke and Wills, 1999; Shaw, 
2006). This study builds on the insights of social network theory to develop a conceptual 
framework that explains the processes whereby NBAs affect CMC in the small firm context. 
We conceptualize operation synchronization and intelligence generation as the 
dependent variables in our framework (Figure 1). Operation synchronization defines as 
channel members jointly performing activities to optimize the supply chain practice, while 
intelligence generation refers to the channel members jointly performing activities in order to 
understand the market environment and customers’ needs in greater depth (Malhotra et al., 
2005; Simatupang and Sridharan, 2005). This conceptualization builds on social network 
theory, according to which, interfirm cooperative behaviors represent an important 
consequence of implementing NBAs (Carey et al., 2011; Gulati et al., 2000). Furthermore, 
scholars also widely recognize that small firms can improve their chance of survival and 
competitive advantage in the marketplace by collaborating with other organizations in their 
supply chain networks (Kaufman et al., 2000). 
Among other NBAs (see Table 1), social interaction is argued to be a salient 
contributor to CMC. Social interaction refers to frequent and deliberate socialization among 
the firms in the supply chain networks (Carey et al., 2011; Villena et al., 2011). We 
conceptualize social interaction as the independent variable of our framework. This 
consideration also builds on social network theory, which argues that social interaction is an 
important antecedent condition for interfirm collaboration because it enables firms to build 
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relationships with each other (Gulati et al., 2000; Uzzi, 1997). In connection to our research 
context, prior studies suggest that small firms often rely on social interactions to improve 
their relationships with their network partners and so strengthen their resource position and 
ability to deal with major crises (Elfring and Hulsink, 2003; Petrick et al., 2016).  
 Prior work on social network theory has increasingly recognized that the 
implementation of NBAs does not automatically lead to cooperative behaviors among firms. 
Instead, NBAs enable the improvement of the quality of (social) ties, which in turn enhances 
cooperation (Gao et al., 2015; Gulati et al., 2000). Applied to our context, the theory suggests 
that the quality of the ties is a critical intervening variable that explains why firms’ 
engagement in social interaction with other channel members may lead to operation 
synchronization and intelligence generation within supply chain networks. Inspired by social 
network theory, this study focuses on two particular types of tie quality
2
: goal congruence 
and relational embeddedness. Goal congruence refers to the extent to which the channel 
members share the same goals (Li et al., 2010; Yan and Dooley, 2013), while relational 
embeddedness means the extent to which trust, respect and reciprocity drive the channel 
relationships (Kale et al., 2000; Kim, 2014). Unlike large organizations with an abundance of 
resources, that can invest heavily in installing operational systems in order to manage their 
supply chain relationships and obtain the resources embedded in these relationships, small 
firms’ supply chain strategy focuses on building high quality relationships with specific 
partners (Fantazy et al., 2009; Stevenson and Spring, 2007). Such “high quality” relationships 
allow small firms to request sudden, unscheduled support from their supply chain partners, 
                                                 
2
 According to social network theory, the quality of ties captures the relational connectedness among network 
actors. It takes different forms, such as tie strength (Granovetter, 1983), goal congruence (Yan and Dooley, 2013, 
2014), relational embeddedness (Bernardes, 2010; Kim, 2014), trust (Li et al., 2010; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998), 
and social capital (Villena et al., 2011; Yim and Leem, 2013). We recognize that many of the forms identified 
here are closely interrelated or sometimes overlap (i.e. trust and social capital), depending on how researchers 
conceptualize their model based on a specific theoretical perspective (Krause et al., 2007; Tsai and Ghoshal, 
1998).   
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who are willing to accommodate the small firms’ special, non-routine requests (Fantazy et al., 
2009). Scholars have used both goal congruence and relational embeddedness to assess the 
quality of the ties existing between small firms and their business partners (Musteen et al., 
2010).  
Drawing further on social network theory, we conceptualize contractual governance 
as a moderating variable in our framework. According to social network theory, the control 
mechanisms that govern the actors’ exchange behaviors within the network environment may 
influence the actors’ interactions’ dynamics (Carey et al., 2011; Granovetter, 1985). 
Contractual governance, a type of control mechanism, is a legally-binding framework (a 
contract agreed by all parties involved), that specifies a list of promises regarding the 
appropriate actions and performance targets for all to follow, with formal laws and 
regulations to reinforce them (Rai et al., 2012). Prior research has pointed out that small 
firms’ behaviors are influenced by the presence of contractual governance (Bayat et al., 2014; 
Hara and Kanai, 1994). In comparison to large organizations, small firms (due to their lack of 
resources) are more vulnerable when dealing with their business partners’ opportunistic 
behaviors (Hara and Kanai, 1994; Zacharakis, 1997). Contractual governance, in this 
situation, helps small firms to safeguard against such undesirable behaviors (Hudson and 
McArthur, 1994; Zacharakis, 1997). Overall, contractual governance emphasizes the 
establishment of formal rules and regulations that reflect the behavioral expectations of the 
parties who participate in the exchange (Carey et al., 2011). We acknowledge that – per 
social network theory – contractual governance can influence the effectiveness of NBAs 
(Gulati et al., 2000; Uzzi, 1997).  
 As Figure 1 shows, our study builds on the insights of social network theory and 
investigates the processes through which social interaction affects operation synchronization 
and intelligence generation in the small firm context. Drawing on social network theory, we 
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also investigate the role of goal congruence, relational embeddedness (mediators), and 
contractual governance (moderator) in such processes. In the following section, we further 
elaborate on the relationships among the key constructs of our conceptual framework and 




Social Interaction and Channel Member Collaboration 
According to social network theory, close, frequent interactions between firms and 
others in the networks promote interfirm cooperation (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997).  
Building on this insight, we expect social interaction to be a driver of operation 
synchronization and intelligence generation. More specifically, social interaction allows a 
firm and its channel members to communicate frequently and develop strong linkages, 
especially in the small firm context. Unlike large organizations, which have formal, dedicated 
departments for handling the interfirm relationships that exist within the supply chain, small 
firms often rely on network-based informal contacts between different entities’ individual 
managers/employees (Cooke and Wills, 1999; Petrick et al., 2016; Sukwadi et al., 2013). 
Engaging in social interaction with other channel members allows small firms to initiate two-
way information-sharing about their supply chain networks’ operational processes (Krause et 
al., 2007; Yim and Leem, 2013) and business plans (Villena et al., 2011). When a small firm 
and its channel members can develop a deeper understanding of other’s operational processes, 
such as inventory handling and lead time management, they are more likely to work together 
to match the supply and demand and so optimize the supply chain practice (Cousins et al., 
2006). Thus, social interaction affects operation synchronization. Sharing information about 
business plans, such as product innovation and technological R&D, also enables small firms 
and their channel members to shift their focus from traditional supply chain operational 
improvement towards exploring or creating new markets (Villena et al., 2011). These channel 
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members are thus more likely to work together towards understanding their market 
environment and customers’ needs. Thus, social interaction affects intelligence generation. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize the following
3
: 
Hypothesis 1: Social interaction is positively associated with operation 
synchronization. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Social interaction is positively associated with intelligence generation. 
 
Goal Congruence and Relational Embeddedness as Mediators 
According to the logic of social network theory, through engaging in frequent, close 
interaction, firms are able to develop high quality ties with others in the networks which, in 
turn, promotes cooperative behaviors (Gao et al., 2015; Gulati et al., 2000). We apply these 
insights to this research context and argue that the quality of the ties acts as a mediator in 
linking social interaction and two types of CMC. In particular, in this study, we examine the 
mediating roles of two salient types of tie quality – goal congruence and relational 
embeddedness. Large organizations 1) have a resources advantage that enables them to 
influence supply chain-level decisions and force other to align their interests with them 
(Morgan et al., 2007) and 2) have well-structured operating systems to manage exchanges in 
complex network environments (Angeles, 2005; Vaidyanathan, 2005). In comparison, small 
firms that wish to establish a collaborative relationship with others in the supply chain must 
begin by engaging in social interaction with potential supply chain partners in order to 
establish goal congruence and relational embeddedness. This is because goal congruence 
creates shared interests within supply chain networks (Bernardes, 2010; Yan and Dooley, 
2013) while relational embeddedness improves the degree of closeness of the channel 
members’ relationships (Chang et al., 2012; Kim, 2014). Both goal congruence and relational 
                                                 
3
 Although these two hypotheses are similar to what has been previously hypothesized (see Table 1). We 
formalize these two hypotheses to facilitate the flow of this article, as it may be easier for readers to understand 
the mediating role of goal congruence and relational embeddedness after we conceptualize the main effects. We 
thank a reviewer to pointing out this limitation.   
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embeddedness function as a social lubricant to prevent potential conflicts and promote 
cooperation (Gao et al., 2015; Gulati et al., 2000).  
More specifically, we anticipate a positive relationship between social interaction and 
goal congruence in the small firm context, for two main reasons. First, when small firms 
engage in social interaction with their channel members, they can develop a better 
understanding of each other’s operational processes, since they will be able to communicate 
informally and develop a better awareness of all sides’ perspectives regarding the supply 
chain operations (Fawcett et al., 2007; Whipple et al., 2010). Second, such actions also 
enable both sides to share their business plans and develop a better understanding of the 
difficulties that each side experiences when designing and implementing business plans in the 
marketplace (Villena et al., 2011; Yan and Dooley, 2013). This awareness will help all 
parties to see the potential value of working collectively to integrate their resources and 
pursue shared goals (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Gnyawali and Park, 2009). Thus, a small firm 
and its channel members may achieve far greater mutual agreement about their goals as a 
result of engaging in social interaction.  
We also anticipate that a positive association exists between social interaction and 
relational embeddedness in the small firm context. When a small firm and its channel 
members interact, such action assuages their doubts about their potential partners’ possible 
opportunistic behaviors during supply chain operations (Kaufman et al., 2000; Kim, 2014). 
Social interaction will give them a better understanding of each side’s operational processes 
and business plans (Bernardes, 2010; Fawcett et al., 2007), which increases the likelihood 
that they will perceive each other as trustworthy supply chain partners (Brunetto and 
Farr‐ Wharton, 2007; Carey et al., 2011; Kim, 2014). Social interaction also increases the 
prospects of reciprocity. As employees from both sides spend longer together in both work 
and social contexts, there may be more opportunities to offer and repay favors related to 
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supply chain operations (Cousins et al., 2006; Kim, 2014). Hence, relational embeddedness 
within supply chain networks may emerge through social interaction between a small firm 
and its channel members. Together, we propose: 
Hypothesis 3: Social interaction is positively associated with goal congruence. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Social interaction is positively associated with relational 
embeddedness. 
 
We expect goal congruence to influence operation synchronization and intelligence 
generation differently. When a small firm and its channel members share the same supply 
chain goals, they are more likely to perceive that their individual objectives are satisfied by 
the pursuit of shared goals (Cao and Zhang, 2010; Yan and Dooley, 2014). This perception, 
in turn, means that they are more likely to orchestrate decisions around planning and 
operating the supply chain in order to achieve optimal effectiveness and efficiency. We apply 
a similar logic to the goal congruence-intelligence generation relationship. When the channel 
members share the same supply chain goals, they are more likely to collaborate in gathering 
market information that may benefit the overall supply chain, believing that their individual 
goals can be achieved as a direct result of working towards these shared goals. However, we 
do not anticipate an equally strong association in the goal congruence-operation 
synchronization relationship or the goal congruence-intelligence generation relationship.   
A small firm and its channel members’ shared goals produce greater internal 
cohesiveness (Yan and Dooley, 2013), enabling them to form a very close team at the supply 
chain level, which accordingly gives them a strong incentive to collaborate when making 
operating decisions. This is in line with previous researchers, who suggest that internal 
cohesion leads to joint problem-solving, effective collaboration, and information sharing 
(Cao and Zhang, 2010; Simatupang and Sridharan, 2005). Simultaneously, extensive 
cohesion among its members also makes the team (group of individuals/ firms) more 
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inwardly-focused (Ancona and Bresman, 2013). Thus, a team (a small firm and its channel 
members at the supply chain level) with high internal cohesion tends to strive more to share 
information internally than to capture new information externally, which is the essence of 
intelligence generation. Based on the proceeding discussion, although goal congruence can 
facilitate both operation synchronization and intelligence generation, the internal cohesion 
generated by a small firm and its channel members’ goal-sharing may offer less incentive for 
them to work together to develop market intelligence. Thus,  
Hypothesis 5: goal congruence has a stronger positive effect on operation 
synchronization than intelligence generation. 
 
We also expect relational embeddedness to influence operation synchronization and 
intelligence generation differently. When a small firm and its channel members enjoy mutual 
respect and trust, and expect reciprocity in their relationships, they are more willing to work 
together to improve the supply chain operation’s effectiveness and efficiency. In this situation 
they are less concerned about their counter-parties’ possible self-interest and opportunism, 
and thus more likely to orchestrate supply chain operational decisions that will benefit all 
parties (Brettel et al., 2011; Kaufman et al., 2000). We also expect relational embeddedness 
to contribute to intelligence generation. When the supply chain relationship contains mutual 
trust and the norms of respect and reciprocity, a small firm and its channel members are less 
likely to view each other as competitors, but rather as part of a team, depending on each other 
to execute the supply chain operations (Krause et al., 2007; Yim and Leem, 2013). Thus, they 
are more likely to collaborate over market information gathering and analysis to identify 
potential business opportunities that can benefit the entire supply chain, and less likely to fear 
that individual channel members will use such information against them during business 
transactions (Patnayakuni et al., 2006).   
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Furthermore, we also suggest that relational embeddedness fosters higher intelligence 
generation than operation synchronization. When a small firm and its channel members 
develop mutual trust and respect, and, most importantly, normalize reciprocity, they become 
more confident that their partners will reciprocate these benefits during supply chain 
operations (Cousins et al., 2006). Therefore, they tend to neglect jointly orchestrating and 
planning supply chain operations. Conversely, a high level of trust, respect and reciprocity 
within a small firm and its channel members’ relationship promotes collaboration over joint 
strategic planning for the overall supply chain’s long-term competitiveness (Hult et al., 2007; 
Wynarczyk and Watson, 2005). This leads them to seek and acquire new, relevant knowledge 
about the market environment (Cao and Zhang, 2010; Malhotra et al., 2005). In general, 
relational embeddedness can facilitate intelligence generation and operation synchronization, 
extensive trust, and respect, while reciprocity among a small firm and its channel members 
can make them feel less concerned about developing joint plans to manage the supply chain 
operations and more focused on obtaining information about future business opportunities. 
Thus,  
Hypothesis 6: relational embeddedness has a stronger positive effect on intelligence 
generation than operation synchronization. 
 
Building on these proceeding arguments and the social network theory (Gulati et al., 
2000; Uzzi, 1997), we suggest that both goal congruence and relational embeddedness act as 
mediators in these relationships. As discussed before, the social network theory posits that 
engagement in NBAs can promote the development of strong linkages among the network 
parties, which in turn enables them to work more collaboratively (Gao et al., 2015; 
Granovetter, 1985). Social interaction can be positioned as bonding actions that strengthen 
the relationship between a small firm and its channel members (Carey et al., 2011; Villena et 
al., 2011). Goal congruence (Krause et al., 2007; Yan and Dooley, 2013) and relational 
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embeddedness (Cousins et al., 2006; Kim, 2014) suggest that the quality of the ties can be 
viewed as robust links among firms within supply chain networks. Both types of CMC - 
operation synchronization and intelligence generation - represent the ways in which a small 
firm and its channel members work collaboratively to ensure that their supply chain is 
efficient and responsive to the dynamic market needs (Cao and Zhang, 2010; Simatupang and 
Sridharan, 2005). The causal chain from social interaction through to the quality of the ties 
(goal congruence and relational embeddedness) to CMC (operation synchronization and 
intelligence generation) is consistent with the bonding actions-linkage-collaboration 
connections suggested by the social network theory (Gao et al., 2015; Uzzi, 1997).  
In particular, when small firms engage in social interaction with their channel 
members, this improves the supply chain networks’ goal congruence and relational 
embeddedness. A high level of goal agreement between a small firm and its channel members 
ensures an internal (within the supply chain networks) cohesiveness that motivates them to 
orchestrate decisions in order to optimize their supply chain operations. However, as argued 
earlier in hypothesis 5, the internal cohesiveness resulting from goal congruence also 
promotes an inward-focus and limits a small firm and its channel members’ incentive to work 
together to process market information. Thus, goal congruence should play a more vital role 
in conveying the effects of social interaction onto operation synchronization rather than 
intelligence generation. On the other hand, a high level of relational embeddedness between a 
small firm and its channel members can inspire everyone to work together to obtain and 
process market information, in order to develop a joint strategy that will promote the overall 
supply chain’s long-term competitiveness. Yet, as argued earlier in hypothesis 6, the presence 
of a high level of relational embeddedness provides less of an incentive for small firms and 
their channel members to work together in organizing joint supply chain operations. Thus, 
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relational embeddedness should play a stronger role in conveying the effects of social 
interaction onto intelligence generation rather than operation synchronization. Thus,   
Hypothesis 7: Goal congruence plays a more prominent role in mediating the direct 
relationship between social interaction and operation synchronization, than that 
between social interaction and intelligence generation.  
 
Hypothesis 8: Relational embeddedness plays a more prominent role in mediating the 
direct relationship between social interaction and intelligence generation, than that 
between social interaction and operation synchronization.  
 
Contractual Governance as a Moderator 
According to the social network theory, the effectiveness of network bonding actions 
can be influenced by contingent factors (Gao et al., 2015; Gulati et al., 2000; Uzzi, 1997). In 
particular, the control mechanisms that govern the actors’ exchange behaviors within the 
network environment may influence the dynamics of the actors’ interactions (Carey et al., 
2011; Luo et al., 2011). Drawing on the theory, we conceptualize contractual governance as a 
moderating variable in our framework. Contractual governance emphasizes the establishment 
of formal rules and regulations that reflect the members’ (firms of all sizes) behavioral 
expectations, who participate in the exchange (Luo et al., 2011; Rai et al., 2012). We suggest 
that the presence of contractual governance weakens the association between social 
interaction and the quality of the ties (goal congruence and relational embeddedness) in the 
small firm context.  
More specifically, a high level of contractual governance (detailed contracts) reduces 
the effect of social interaction on goal congruence. This is because a detailed contract 
codifies a small firm and each of its channel members’ obligations and responsibilities 
regarding supply chain operations (Li et al., 2010; Luo et al., 2011). When the presence of a 
detailed contract regulates the supply chain operations, a small firm and its channel members 
are fully aware of how to behave as supply chain partners. In this situation, engaging social 
interactions to develop a bilateral understanding and shared vision in order to achieve tasks 
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and outcomes in the supply chain becomes less effective. Similarly, a high level of 
contractual governance also reduces the effect of social interaction on relational 
embeddedness. A detailed contract clarifies any uncertainty and risks associated with 
opportunistic behaviors within a supply chain relationship (Li et al., 2010; Zhou and Xu, 
2012). It helps both parties (a small firm and its channel members) to build mutual trust, 
norms of reciprocity, and mutual respect relatively quickly (Li et al., 2010). As a result, using 
social interaction to develop and maintain relational embeddedness between a small firm and 
its supply chain partners also become less effective.  
Furthermore, small firms are less likely to have spare resources (in comparison with 
large organizations) that allow for more discretionary and flexible usage (Taylor and Banks, 
1992). Consequently, the managers of small firms are less likely to allocate resources to 
activities that offer few returns. In this situation, where contractual governance is well-
established to regulate the channel members’ behaviors, our prior arguments suggest that 
social interaction will have less effect on goal congruence and relational embeddedness. This 
means that the returns on investing in activities related to social interaction shrink when 
contractual governance is strong. As a result, we argue that small firms’ managers will be less 
likely to allocate resources to social interaction. This further reduces the effectiveness of 
social interaction in constructing goal congruence and relational embeddedness in the supply 
chain network. Combining the above discussion, we hypothesize:   
Hypothesis 9: Contractual governance negatively moderates the relationship between 
social interaction and goal congruence 
 
Hypothesis 10: Contractual governance negatively moderates the relationship 




Data Collection  
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Our data relate to a cross-sectional questionnaire survey of small firms in the UK 
wholesale and retail sector. We chose this particular sector for two reasons. First, the 
effectiveness and efficiency of supply chain operations are critical for firms’ success in this 
sector (Matopoulos et al., 2007). Second, prior research reports that participation in 
networking and socialization activities helps these firms to improve their supply chain 
relationship and business performance (Elg and Johansson, 1996).  
We contacted a marketing company to request the contact information of small firms 
in the UK wholesale and retail sector. We randomly selected 1,500 firms and sent out four 
waves of emails to increase the response rate. We then sent a cover letter to the CEO (or 
general manager) of the firm to ask him/her to complete the questionnaire on behalf of that 
firm, in 2015. Following the recommendations of previous researchers regarding the supply 
chain relationship (e.g. Bernardes, 2010; Li et al., 2010), we asked the CEOs to answer all of 
the questions based on their relationship with a major supplier. Finally, we obtained 385 
usable questionnaires from organizations with an average annual revenue of £3.348 million, 
39.777 employees, and 10.564 years of business establishment. On comparing the answers 
between the early and late respondents, we found no significant differences (Armstrong and 
Overton, 1977). Therefore, the probability of non-response bias is minimal. 
 
Measurement  
We measured all of the variables using multi-item, Likert-type scales (see appendix 
1). For social interaction, we adapted measurement items from Sun et al. (2012), Villena et 
al. (2011) and Yli Renko et al. (2001) to assess the activities that small firms pursue in order 
to socialize and develop their relationships with their channel member colleagues. We used 
measurement items adapted from relevant studies (Kale et al., 2000; Sun et al., 2012) as a 
basis for assessing relational embeddedness, that highlights mutual respect, trust and 
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reciprocity in the relationship between a small firm and its channel members. For goal 
congruence, we adapted and modified measurements from prior studies (Li et al., 2010; Yan 
and Dooley, 2014) to assess the extent to which a small firm and its channel members share 
the same goals. For contractual mechanism, we adapted the measurement items of Luo et al. 
(2011) and Rai et al. (2012) to assess the use of formal contracts within supply chain 
operations. We adopted and modified the measurements from prior studies (Malhotra et al., 
2005; Simatupang and Sridharan, 2005) to assess operation synchronization and intelligence 
generation (jointly performing activities to optimize supply chain operation and improve 
market intelligence, respectively). 
 Finally, we also used the firm’s size (based on revenue), age, employee numbers, 
business area (within the wholesale or retail sectors), competitive intensity, market 
turbulence, risk-sharing, resource-sharing, communication style and channel commitment as 
the control variables, in line with the relevant literature (Cao and Zhang, 2010; Matopoulos et 
al., 2007). We applied logarithmic transformation to variables such as firm size, age, and 
employee number, in line with prior studies in the field (e.g. Villena et al., 2011; Yan and 
Dooley, 2013). We created business area dummies, using “Miscellaneous” as the benchmark 
group. We adopted and modified two items to assess competitive intensity (“the competition 
in our industry is cutthroat”), and market turbulence (“channel members need changes all the 
time”) from Hult et al. (2007). We used a single item to assess risk-sharing (“our firm and 
supply chain partners share risks”), resource-sharing (“our firm and supply chain partners 
share financial and non-financial resources”), communication style (“our firm and our supply 
chain partners influence each other’s decisions through discussion rather than requests”), and 
channel commitment (“our business functions are integrated in serving the needs of our 
supply chain partners”), adopted and modified from various sources (e.g. Cao and Zhang, 
2010; Yim and Leem, 2013).  
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All of the variables in our model feature in prior studies, using multi-item scales with 
a few item variations (usually 1 or 2 different items). To ensure that we captured the essence 
of the measurement, we first selected a few highly-regarded studies and adopted all of the 
measurement items (including both repeated and different items) to form our initial survey 
design. We then conducted a pre-test with seven representatives from small firms. These 
respondents answered all of the survey items and provided feedback about the clarity of the 
survey questions and instructions as well as the aptness of the terminology. Finally, we 
deleted inappropriate items, refined the language of the remaining items, and finalized the 
survey, based on the respondents’ suggestions.  
 
Validity and Reliability  
We followed Podsakoff et al. (2012) in using multiple statistical remedies to ensure 
that common method bias was not an issue for this study. First, we performed Harman’s 
single factor test by subjecting all of the items in our study to exploratory factor analysis. The 
result of an unrotated principal component analysis indicated that a single method factor fails 
to explain the majority of the variance (the highest single variance extracted from the data is 
41.442%). Second, we used CFA common latent factor techniques (Podsakoff et al., 2012). 
We first compared the factor loading between the CFA model, with and without the common 
latent factor, and found that the differences were not significant. Furthermore, we constrained 
the factor loadings to the common factor to be equal. We squared the constrained factor 
loading and found that it only accounted for 31.697% of the variance (less than the majority 
of the variance). In general, all of the results suggested that common method variance is not a 
concern for this study.  
“Insert Table 2 about here” 
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 We then performed confirmatory factor analysis to compare different models. 
According to suggestions by Hair et al. (2010) regarding the comparative fit index (CFI), 
normed fit index (NFI), goodness of fit index (GFI), and root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA), our hypothesized model exhibited the best fit (X
2
 = 169.528; df  = 
75; X
2
/df = 2.260; p = .000; NFI = .938; CFI = .964; GFI = .944; RMSEA = .057) (see Table 
3). We also calculated the value of the composite reliability (CR) and average variance 
extracted (AVE). Table 2 showed that the CR value is greater than .70 for all of the 
constructs in our findings, so the construct reliability is confirmed (Hair et al., 2010). The 
value of the AVE for all constructs exceeded the .50 benchmark (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). 
Furthermore, we calculated the square root value of the AVE for each construct and found 
that the results were greater than those for all of the correlations with other constructs (see 
Table 2). Finally, we calculated the variance inflation factors (VIFs) to assess the possibility 
of multicollinearity. The results suggested that all of the VIFs were below 3, so 
multicollinearity is not a serious problem in this analysis (Hair et al., 2010) 
“Insert Table 3 about here” 
Analysis and Results 
To assess our hypotheses, we performed structural equation modeling using SPSS 
Amos. Table 4 presents the results of our analysis. To examine the direct effects between 
social interaction and the different types of CMC, as indicated in hypotheses 1 and 2, we 
estimated Model 1 (X
2
 = 93.437; df = 72; X
2
/df = 1.298; p = .046; NFI = .959; CFI = .989; 
GFI = .979; RMSEA = .028). We found strong support for our Hypothesis 1 regarding the 
positive effect of social interaction on operation synchronization (Model 1: β = .209, p 
< .010), as well as hypothesis 2 regarding the positive effect of social interaction on 
intelligence generation (Model 1: β = .289, p < .001).  
“Insert Table 4 about here” 
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We estimate Model 2 (X
2
 = 335.263; df = 179; X
2
/df = 1.873; p = .000; NFI = .912; 
CFI = .954; GFI = .941; RMSEA = .048) to examine the various associations among the 
variables proposed in hypotheses 3-6. The results in Table 4 reveal that social interaction has 
a positive relation with goal congruence (Model 2: β = .289, p < .001), supporting hypothesis 
3, as well as that social interaction has a positive relation to relational embeddedness (Model 
2: β = .378, p < .001), supporting hypothesis 4. We also found that goal congruence has a 
positively relationship to operation synchronization (Model 2: β = .398, p < .001), whereas 
goal congruence does not have a significant effect on intelligence generation (Model 2: β 
= .091, n.s.). This result supports hypothesis 5. On the other hand, relational embeddedness 
has no significant effect on operation synchronization (Model 2: β = -.019, n.s.), while 
relational embeddedness has a positive relationship with intelligence generation (Model 2: β 
= .256, p < .001). This result supports hypothesis 6. 
To examine the mediating relationship proposed in hypotheses 7 and 8, we estimate 
Model 3 (X
2
 = 324.176; df = 177; X
2
/df = 1.832; p = .000; NFI = .915; CFI = .957; GFI = .943; 
RMSEA = .048), which includes both direct and indirect effects in a single structural 
equation model simultaneously (Jose, 2013). Hypothesis 7 infers that goal congruence plays a 
more prominent role in mediating the direct relationship between social interaction and 
operation synchronization than that between social interaction and intelligence generation. 
Our results show that the social interaction-goal congruence association (Model 3: β = .272, p 
< .001) and goal congruence-operation synchronization association (Model 3: β = .371, p 
< .001) are positive and significant when accounting for the effect of social interaction on 
operation synchronization. We then conducted the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) to examine the 
signifcance of the indirect effect. We found that this indirect path was signficant (Sobel test 
statistic = 3.015, p < .010). In contrast, our results show that the indirect path from social 
interaction through goal congruence to intelligence generation is poorly-connected, as it has 
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no goal congruence and so no significant effect on intellignence generation (Model 3: β 
= .052, n.s.).  Further, the Sobel test also confirms the insignificance of the indirect effects 
(Sobel test statistic =.080, n.s.). In general, hypothesis 7 is supported.   
Hypothesis 8 posits that relational embeddedness plays a more prominent role in 
mediating the direct relationship between social interaction and intelligence generation than 
that between social interaction and operation synchronization. We adopt the same method as 
above to test this hypothesis. Our results show that the indirect path from social interaction 
through relational embeddedness (Model 3: β = .367, p < .001) to operation synchronization 
is poorly-connected, due to the insignificant effect of relational embeddedness on operation 
synchronization (Model 3: β = -.076, n.s.). The result of the Sobel test further confirms this 
(Sobel test statistic = -1.1051, n.s.). In contrast, the indirect path from social interaction 
through relational embeddedness (Model 3: β = .367, p < .001) to intelligence generation 
(Model 3: β = .176, p < .050) is positively connected. The result of the Sobel test further 
confirms the significance of the indirect effect (Sobel test statistic = 2.112, p < .050). Thus, 
hypothesis 8 is supported.  
Hypothesis 9 posits that contractual governance negatively moderates the relationship 
between social interaction and goal congruence, while hypothesis 10 posits that contractual 
governance negatively moderates the relationship between social interaction and relational 
embeddedness. We follow Kenny and Judd (1984) to create a latent interaction term that 
includes all of the possible products of the measurement items (total 3 x 2 = 6 items) of social 
interaction (3 items) and contractual governance (2 items). We estimated a new structural 
equation model, including the direct effect of social interaction, contractual governance, and 
interaction term on both goal congruence and relational embeddedness (X
2
 = 502.597; df = 
281; X
2
/df = 1.789; p = .000; NFI = .904; CFI = .953; GFI = .927; RMSEA = .045). Our 
results show that a negative and significant effect exists between the interaction term and goal 
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congruence (Model 4: β = -.084, p < .050), but no significant effect exists between the 
interaction term and relational embeddedness (Model 4: β = -.047, n.s.). These results support 
hypothesis 9, but reject hypothesis 10. Figure 2 illustrates this graphically, showing that the 
effects of social interaction on goal congruence are weaker when the contractual governance 
is high. Finally, we estimated a full model (Model 5: X
2
 = 638.470; df = 375; X
2
/df = 1.708; p 
= .000; NFI = .900; CFI = .953; GFI = .953; RMSEA = .043). We found that all path 
relationships still hold and are in line with our earlier models.  
“Insert Figure 2 about here” 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Academic Contributions 
Our research makes several important contributions. First, whereas prior studies focus 
on understanding the direct link between NBAs and CMC, few studies attempt to understand 
the processes through which NBAs contribute to CMC (see Table 1). Our findings clarify the 
roles of goal congruence and relational embeddedness (two types of ties quality) by revealing 
that social interaction (a type of NBA) mainly affects operation synchronization (a type of 
CMC) via goal congruence, while mainly affecting intelligence generation (another type of 
CMC) via relational embeddedness. This is the first study to shed light on the specific role of 
different mediators in transferring the impact of NBAs to different CMCs. Furthermore, we 
develop the conceptual reasoning based on social network theory to explain such differential 
intermediate mechanisms. According to social network theory, frequent and close interactions 
improve the quality of the ties between a focal firm and its network partners, which 
ultimately promotes interfirm cooperation (Gao et al., 2015; Gulati et al., 2000; Uzzi, 1997). 
More specifically, the theory offers a general description about the mediating role of tie 
quality in the NBAs-CMC relationship. We refine this theoretical lens by distinguishing the 
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role that different types of tie quality play in connecting NBAs with different types of CMC, 
and empirically confirm the distinct intermediate mechanisms. In doing so, our work enriches 
social network theory’s perspective of the NBAs-CMC relationship. 
Second, prior research offers limited insights on the contingency factors that influence 
the NBAs-CMC relationship (see Table 1). Our research contributes to this line of enquiry by 
investigating the contingent role of contractual governance in moderating the strength of the 
relationship between NBAs and the quality of ties, which subsequently affects the NBAs-
CMC association. Our results suggest that contractual governance negatively moderates the 
relationship between social interaction and goal congruence, but we do not find negative 
moderating effects of contractual governance significant in the relationship between social 
interaction and relational embeddedness. One possible explanation is that, even though the 
overall effectiveness of using social interaction to build relational embeddedness is weaker 
when a detailed contract exists, small firm managers can still expect to gain additional mutual 
respect, trust and reciprocity in the supply chain relationship by engaging in frequent, close 
interactions with their channel member colleagues. This is because the development of a very 
high level of mutual respect, trust and reciprocity in the supply chain relationship requires 
ongoing communication and socialization over a long time period (Cousins et al., 2006; 
Krause et al., 2007). In other words, a small firm that decides to engage in frequent, close 
interaction with it channels members can still advance the relational embeddedness within the 
supply chain, despite the presence of contractual governance.  
As another important contribution to social network theory’s perspective of the 
NBAs-CMC relationship, this study is the first, to our knowledge, to address the conceptually 
implied but unexamined contingency factors. More specifically, the use of formal contracts is 
very common practice in managing supply chain operations (Li et al., 2010; Zhou and Xu, 
2012). In an attempt to extend the social network theory, we seek deeper insights on the role 
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of contractual governance as a contingency factor that might affect the strength of the 
relationship between social interaction and goal congruence/relational embeddedness. We 
reason that the use of formal contracts reduces the effectiveness of social interaction because 
it replaces certain functions of social interaction by enabling the establishment of bilateral 
understanding and reduces the motives for opportunistic behaviors by a small firm and its 
channel members (Li et al., 2010; Luo et al., 2011; Zhou and Xu, 2012). According to our 
findings, this is particularly true when a small firm intends to engage in frequent, close 
interaction with its channel member colleagues for the purpose of developing goal 
congruence. Altogether, we enrich social network theory’s perspective of the NBAs-CMC 
relationship by offering a contingency perspective.  
 Our final contribution pertains to the empirical context. Whereas prior studies focus 
on understanding the impact of NBAs on CMC generally (see Table 1), we focus specifically 
on the small firm context. More specifically, we identify that NBAs (social interaction) and 
the quality of the ties (goal congruence and relational embeddedness) are closely related to 
small firms’ business strategy in the network environment. We also identify two types of 
CMC (operation synchronization and intelligence generation), as well as a moderator 
(contractual governance) that is common among small firms when conducting supply chain 
management. On the one hand, we argue that NBAs are more important for small firms than 
large organizations, due to the former’s lack of organizational resources. Therefore, small 
firms must rely on NBAs if they are to complete in the marketplace (Cooke and Wills, 1999; 
Elfring and Hulsink, 2003). CMC can help small firms to overcome their resource limitations 
and pursue business opportunities (e.g. Brettel et al., 2011; Dutta and Hora, 2017; 
Matopoulos et al., 2007; Petrick et al., 2016). Thus, it is important to understand the 
relationship between NBAs and CMC in the small firm context. Our research demonstrates 
the processes through which NBAs affect CMC in a small firm context and how control 
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mechanisms can affect such processes. Although our study provides only a snapshot of small 
firms’ approach to employing NBAs in their supply chain management strategy, our findings, 
in combination with those of previous studies, can provide valuable insights into how such an 
approach mitigates their liability of smallness in developing competitive strategies to employ 
in dynamic marketplaces. 
 
Management Implications 
 Our findings offer several important management implications. First, our findings 
suggest that social interaction is an important antecedent condition for developing operation 
synchronization and intelligence generation in supply chain operations, as well as enhancing 
the goal congruence and relational embeddedness between a small firm and its channel 
member colleagues. This means that small firm managers who wish to promote operation 
synchronization and intelligence generation within the supply chain can deliberately socialize 
and interact with the firms’ key supply chain partners. Furthermore, small firm managers can 
also choose to invest in facilitating social interaction actions to promote goal congruence and 
relational embeddedness within the supply chain relationship.  
 Second, our results challenge the conventional wisdom that assumes that a high level 
of tie quality can always lead to strong, positive CMC (Krause et al., 2007; Yan and Dooley, 
2014; Yim and Leem, 2013). This is based on our finding that goal congruence has stronger 
effects on operation synchronization than intelligence generation, while relational 
embeddedness has stronger effects on intelligence generation than operation synchronization. 
Therefore, small firm managers should exercise caution regarding where they invest their 
resources in order to improve a specific type of tie quality. Unlike large organizations, small 
firms are more likely to face resource constraints related to the number of projects in which 
they invest (Cooke and Wills, 1999; Elfring and Hulsink, 2003). Understanding the effects of 
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different types of tie quality on CMC can help small firm managers to develop more effective 
strategic investment plans to target a particular type of CMC. 
 Third, our further investigation also revealed two very specific mediation paths, 
which have important managerial implications. More specifically, small firm managers 
should understand that the benefits of social interaction in improving operation 
synchronization depend on the development of congruent business objectives between the 
firm and its channel member colleagues. On the other hand, simply engaging in social 
interactions with their fellow channel members is insufficient; it is more important to develop 
mutual respect, a norm of reciprocity, and mutual trust between a firm and its channel 
members that will help to promote intelligence generation activities. Small firm managers 
who organize the implementation of social interaction should guide such actions toward 
building either goal congruence or relational embeddedness, which in turn foster different 
types of CMC.  
 Finally, our results indicate that contractual governance has negative moderating 
effects on the social interaction-goal congruence relationship but not on the social interaction-
relational embeddedness relationship. Thus, small firm managers should recognize that the 
presence of a detailed contract might harm the firm’s efforts to engage in frequent, close 
interactions with its channel member colleagues in certain situations. Accordingly, we 
recommend that small firm managers who wish to promote goal congruence between the firm 
and its channel members by engaging in social interaction should not initiate any contractual 
arrangements, since a high level of contractual governance will reduce the effectiveness of 
social interaction in enhancing goal congruence. 
 
Limitations and Future Research  
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We acknowledge a number of limitations and future research opportunities. First, our 
study’s cross-sectional design prevents us from drawing any definite conclusions about the 
causal relationships and raises concerns about common method variance, despite our 
precautionary measures and the statistical evidence opposing its presence (Podsakoff et al., 
2012). Future researchers might employ a longitudinal research design in order to confirm 
this causality empirically and reduce the amount of common method variance. Furthermore, 
we asked the CEOs from our sample small firms to answer all of the questions based on the 
firm’s relationship with a major supplier, which is a method that many previous researchers 
have adopted in supply chain relationship research (e.g. Carey et al., 2011), but this may still 
have led to selection bias. Future studies might try other ways of specifying the supply chain 
relationship in their empirical design. 
Second, the key variables (such as social interaction, goal congruence, etc.) within our 
conceptual framework capture, at best, the dyadic aspect of the supply chain relationship. 
Due to the difficulty of obtaining objective data about dyadic relationship dynamics, 
consistent with prior studies that adopt a similar research focus (e.g. Bernardes, 2010; Li et 
al., 2010), we relied on the managers’ perceptions in evaluating these dyadic relationship 
dynamics. Future researchers may develop lab- or quasi-experiments to capture these more 
effectively. Third, engaging in social interaction may allow small firms not only to bond with 
their existing channel member colleagues but also to recruit new ones (Cousins et al., 2006; 
Villena et al., 2011). Scholars refer to this as network-bridging, drawing on the bridging 
aspect of SCT (Newell et al., 2004). Future researchers might focus on exploring network 
bridging’s influence on CMC. Together, we can offer a more comprehensive picture of the 
SCT perspective of CMC. 
Fourth, by focusing specifically on the perspective of small firms, this study ignores 
the debate regarding whether NBAs, the quality of ties, and control mechanisms may also be 
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relevant to CMC in the large organization context. Future researchers should conduct similar 
studies using the perspective of large organizations. Based on the findings of this study, we 
can offer a more comprehensive picture regarding the use of NBAs in formulating a supply 
chain management strategy for firms of all sizes. Lastly, we used a sample of small-sized, 
UK-based wholesale and retail firms in this research. We need to recognize that we may need 
to limit the generalizability of our findings to firms within a specific industry and country 
context. Future studies on different industries or countries than our setting could help to 
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Channel Member Collaboration (CMC)  Impact paths 
Moderating the 
impacts of NBAs 
Finding summaries Context 




Product design; process design; lead time  
Indirect impact (via 
relational capital) 
None 
Informal socialization generates relational capital, which in turn can 
lead to improved supplier relationship outcomes. Formal socialization 






Information flow integration  Direct impact None 
Formal and information interaction routines enable integration of 
information flows across firms’ supply chain. 
Practitioners (mixed firms) 




10 various types of CMC include (unique 
product & service, faster R&D cycle times, 
superior quality, etc.)  
Direct impact None 
Many companies are found to have placed most of their emphasis on 
connectivity, often overlooking the willingness construct. 
Practitioners (mixed firms) 
Krause et al. 
(2007) 
Supplier development   Cost; quality; delivery; and flexibility Direct impact None 
Buyer commitment and social capital accumulation with key suppliers 







Indirect impact (via 
network-shared cognition) 
None 
Relational embeddedness should be treated as a critical antecedent to 
performance  
Practitioners (mixed firms) 





Operation Performance Direct impact None 
Collaborative relationships offer higher levels of satisfaction and 
performance than transactional relationship. 
Practitioners (Mixed firms) 
Carey et al. 
(2011) 
Social interaction ties 
Buyer innovation improvement; buyer cost 
improvement 
Indirect impact (via trust, 
obligation, identification) 
Legal bonds 
Trust, obligation, and identification partially mediate the link between 
social interaction ties and innovation performance. 
Mixed firms 
Villena et al. 
(2011) 
Social interaction  
Strategic performance; operation 
performance 
Direct impact (curvilinear) None 
There is an inverted curvilinear relationship between social capital 
and performance. 
Mixed firms 
Chang et al. 
(2012) 
Frequency of contact Financial performance 
Indirect impact (via 
innovation and adaptation) 
None 
Innovation and adaptation function as the mediating mechanism 
delivering the beneficial influences of relationship quality to 
performance 
Mixed firms 




Design quality; design efficiency Direct impact 
Uncertainty (Task; 
relational)  
Communication intensity is positively associated with project 
performance when either tasks or relationship uncertainty is high, but 
negative associated with performance when task uncertainty is low.   
Mixed firms 
Yim and Leem 
(2013) 
Network use; Network 
appropriateness 
Supply chain integration (information 
sharing; collaboration and resource 
exchange) 
Direct impact None 
Supply chain integration played a mediating role in the relationships 
between structural capital (network use and network appropriateness) 






Financial performance; operation 
performance 
Indirect impact (via 
relational embeddedness) 
None 
The results indicate that the understanding of the structural dimension 
does help to enhance operational performance of a buying firm, but it 




Operation synchronization; Intelligence 
generation 





Social interaction tends to affect operation synchronization via goal 
congruence, while affects intelligence generation via relational 
embeddedness. Contractual governance has stronger negative effect 
on the relationship between social interaction and goal congruence 
than the relationship between social interaction and relational 
embeddedness. 
Small firms 
Contribution 1: Simultaneously examining two new types of CMC and distinguishing indirect 
impacts of NBAs on specific CMC through different mediators  
Contribution 2: Introducing a new moderator and examining its effects on the impacts of 
NBAs 
Contribution 3: Focusing 
on small firm context 
Notes: 
Mixed Firms = Mixed large, medium and small firms   
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Correlations and Reliabilities 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1. Firm Age ---                     
2. Firm Size  .146* ---                    
3. Firm Employees .177* .508* ---                   
4. Building and Construction .039 .047 .034 ---                  
5. Chemicals .048 -.064 -.058 -.156* ---                 
6. IT, Computer, and Electronics .085 .077 .082 -.238* -.133* ---                
7. Machinery and Equipment  -.099 -.096 -.053 -.167* -.094 -.143* ---               
8. Clothing and Textile .048 .112* .048 -.190* -.106* -.162* -.114* ---              
9. Medical Devices and Supplies -.054 -.005 -.038 -.202* -.113* -.172* -.121* -.137* ---             
10. Competitive Intensity .015 .033 .069 .085 -.110* .031 -.002 .035 .017 ---            
11. Market Turbulence -.019 -.065 .001 .108* -.032 -.008 .020 -.054 -.048 .416* ---           
12. Risk-sharing .002 .068 .115* .005 -.087 -.039 .009 .088 -.017 .092 .062 ---          
13. Resource- sharing .006 .091 .188* .033 -.06 -.015 .015 .058 -.079 .162* .067 .467* ---         
14. Communication Style .052 .067 .122* -.002 -.057 -.111* .015 .208* -.115* .088 -.018 .415* .413* ---        
15. Channel Commitment .103* .028 .009 -.003 .019 -.054 .044 .075 -.042 .095 .115* .200* .215* .259* ---       
16. Social Interaction .056 .140* .134* .136* .020 .011 -.145* .027 -.120* .146* .039 .325* .298* .454* .331* .738      
17. Goal Congruence .032 .092 .069 .070 -.052 -.033 -.025 .108* -.087 .094 .022 .358* .236* .496* .345* .412* .812     
18. Relational Embeddedness .001 .028 -.038 .054 .031 -.093 .029 .087 -.112* .018 .082 .358* .287* .517* .380* .524* .535* .756    
19. Contractual Governance .014 .145* .293* -.012 -.067 .025 .001 .096 -.066 .160* .046 .315* .404* .398* .327* .347* .464* .371* .824   
20. Operation Synchronization -.018 .089 .152* .002 -.072 -.015 -.055 .160* -.036 .125* .067 .549* .500* .436* .370* .404* .499* .390* .539* .764  
21. Intelligence Generation .069 .086 .130* .046 -.082 -.069 .095 .079 -.087 .167* .104* .432* .436* .541* .380* .443* .437* .492* .416* .474* .789 
                      
Mean .964 .538 1.207 --- --- --- --- --- --- 3.304 2.922 2.660 2.500 3.320 3.327 3.102 3.829 3.604 3.157 2.800 3.305 
Standard deviation .313 .290 .589 --- --- --- --- --- --- .735 .764 1.027 1.013 1.008 .939 .869 .746 .692 .904 .909 .933 
Composite Reliability --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- .778 .853 .790 .809 .735 .768 
Average Variance Extracted --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- .544 .659 .572 .679 .583 .623 
Notes: 
N = 385; *p < .05 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) square roots are show in bold on the correlation matrix diagonal 
Firm Age is measured as log(year since establishment) 
Firm Size is measured as log(annual revenue £million in 2015) 
Firm employee is measured as log(employee number) 








Table 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis - Model Fit 





Goodness of fit 
index (GFI) 
Root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) 
         
6 Factor Model: Hypothesized Model 169.528 75 2.260 .000 .964 .938 .944 .057 
5 Factor Model: SI, (GC + RE), CG, OS, IG 377.987 80 4.725 .000 .887 .862 .872 .098 
4 Factor Model: SI, (GC + RE), CG, (OS + IG) 466.958 84 5.559 .000 .854 .829 .841 .109 
3 Factor Model: (SI + GC + RE), CG, (OS + IG) 658.650 87 7.571 .000 .783 .759 .785 .131 
2 Factor Model: (SI + GC + RE + CG), (OS + IG) 827.523 89 9.298 .000 .719 .697 .753 .147 
1 Factor Model: Omnibus Model  884.857 90 9.832 .000 .698 .676 .745 .152 
Note:  
SI = Social Interaction;  
GC = Goal Congruence 
RE = Relational Embeddedness 
CG = Contractual Governance 
OS = Operation Synchronization 






















Table 4: Findings 
Path Relationship Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Framework Model Path:      
Social Interaction  Operation Synchronization .209(2.902)**  .153(1.921)†  .137(1.789)† 
Social Interaction  Intelligence Generation .289(3.956)***  .218(2.658)**  .211(2.654)** 
Social Interaction  Goal Congruence  .289(3.821)*** .272(3.596)*** .193(2.718)** .180(2.541)* 
Social Interaction  Relational Embeddedness  .378(4.573)*** .367(4.460)*** .328(4.278)*** .324(4.220)*** 
Goal Congruence  Operation Synchronization  .398(6.068)*** .371(5.531)***  .396(5.871)*** 
Goal Congruence  Intelligence Generation  .091(1.470) .052(.811)  .060(.940) 
Relational Embeddedness  Operation Synchronization  .019(.294) .076(1.079)  .049(.704) 
Relational Embeddedness  Intelligence Generation  .256(3.652)*** .176(2.394)*  .173(2.367)* 
Contractual Governance  Goal Congruence    .406(5.712)*** .432(6.158)*** 
Contractual Governance  Relational Embeddedness    .251(3.750)*** .248(3.717)*** 












      
Control Variables Path:      
Firm Age  Operation Synchronization -.074(-1.642) -.065(-1.502) -.062(-1.423)  -.061(-1.406) 
Firm Age  Intelligence Generation .046(1.024) .048(1.071) .052(1.191)  .055(1.243) 
Firm Age  Goal Congruence  -.023(-.501) -.024(-.516) -.006(-.133) -.003(-.064) 
Firm Age  Relational Embeddedness  -.026(-.601) -.026(-.591) -.029(-.678) -.027(-.641) 
Firm Size  Operation Synchronization -.031(-.593) -.037(-.750) -.048(-.965)  .075(1.499) 
Firm Size  Intelligence Generation .003(.054) .009(.187) -.006(-.109)  .037(.724) 
Firm Size  Goal Congruence  .035(.659) .037(.701) .042(.839) -.153(-2.855)** 
Firm Size  Relational Embeddedness  .028(.556) .029(.580) .041(.856) -.207(-3.826)*** 
Firm Employees  Operation Synchronization .062(1.198) .083(1.651)† .071(1.407)  -.050(-1.005) 
Firm Employees  Intelligence Generation .010(.198) .053(1.023) .035(.687)  -.007(-.135) 
Firm Employees  Goal Congruence  -.036(-.671) -.035(-.656) -.146(-2.710)** .046(.905) 
Firm Employees  Relational Embeddedness  -.130(-2.516)* -.129(-2.493)* -.208(-3.845)*** .042(.862) 
Building and Construction  Operation Synchronization -.004(-.065) -.015(-.271) -.023(-.421)  -.024(-.447) 
Building and Construction  Intelligence Generation .002(.044) .008(.139) -.004(-.074)  -.006(-.102) 
Building and Construction  Goal Congruence  .052(.906) .054(.929) .076(1.375) .078(1.425) 
Building and Construction  Relational Embeddedness  .021(.387) .022(.399) .045(.859) .045(.848) 
Chemicals  Operation Synchronization -.021(-.419) .005(.094) -.005(-.102)  -.003(-.062) 
Chemicals  Intelligence Generation -.054(-1.090) -.043(-.870) -.056(-1.140)  -.058(-1.185) 
Chemicals  Goal Congruence  -.024(-.472) -.023(-.444) .003(.062) .005(.099) 
Chemicals  Relational Embeddedness  .011(.235) .012(.244) .045(.955) .044(.946) 
IT, Computer, and Electronics  Operation Synchronization .037(.681) .039(.743) .033(.625)  .034(.649) 
IT, Computer, and Electronics  Intelligence Generation -.034(-.627) -.022(-.401) -.031(-.577)  -.032(-.606) 
IT, Computer, and Electronics  Goal Congruence  .029(.508) .030(.532) .025(.461) .023(.435) 
IT, Computer, and Electronics  Relational Embeddedness  -.020(-.370) -.019(-.352) -.012(-.239) -.012(-.242) 
Machinery and Equipment  Operation Synchronization -.034(-.668) -.059(-1.217) -.032(-.633)  -.035(-.712) 
Machinery and Equipment  Intelligence Generation .132(2.606)** .078(1.581) .116(2.276)*  .116(2.287)* 
Machinery and Equipment  Goal Congruence  .018(.348) .016(.308) .016(.322) .015(.298) 
Machinery and Equipment  Relational Embeddedness  .106(2.084)* .105(2.068)* .100(2.064)* .101(2.074)* 
Clothing and Textile  Operation Synchronization .109(2.059)* .091(1.794)† .101(2.006)*  .100(1.991)* 
Clothing and Textile  Intelligence Generation -.011(-.211) -.030(-.577) -.014(-.270)  -.012(-.244) 
Clothing and Textile  Goal Congruence  .030(.559) .029(.547) .030(.586) .029(.572) 
Clothing and Textile  Relational Embeddedness  .009(.172) .009(.181) -.002(-.049) -.001(-.017) 
Medical Devices and Supplies  Operation Synchronization .041(.776) .038(.753) .045(.894)  .047(.925) 
Medical Devices and Supplies  Intelligence Generation .004(.083) -.003(-.066) .007(.141)  .007(.128) 
Medical Devices and Supplies  Goal Congruence  -.002(-.036) -.002(-.037) .004(.085) .004(.070) 
Medical Devices and Supplies  Relational Embeddedness  -.018(-.348) -.017(-.335) -.010(-.203) -.010(-.210) 
Competitive Intensity  Operation Synchronization -.004(-.071) .004(.082) -.017(-.348)  -.013(-.260) 
Competitive Intensity  Intelligence Generation .035(.728) .091(1.866)† .062(1.250)  .061(1.244) 
Competitive Intensity  Goal Congruence  .011(.228) .013(.261) .002(.051) .001(.020) 
Competitive Intensity  Relational Embeddedness  -.158(-3.153)** -.157(-3.124)** -.163(-3.332)*** -.161(-3.298)** 
Note:  
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.010; * p < 0.050; † p < 0.100 





Table 3: Findings (Continue) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Control Variables Path (Continue):      
Market Turbulence  Operation Synchronization .016(.318) .014(.301) .025(.526)  .008(.162) 
Market Turbulence  Intelligence Generation .054(1.133) .025(.519) .040(.831)  .097(2.086)* 
Market Turbulence  Goal Congruence  -.008(-.158) -.009(-.171) .008(.166) .022(.477) 
Market Turbulence  Relational Embeddedness  .091(1.885)† .090(1.870)† .096(2.077)* .040(.845) 
Risk Sharing  Operation Synchronization .351(6.486)*** .298(5.596)*** .289(5.456)***  .282(5.365)*** 
Risk Sharing  Intelligence Generation .135(2.591)* .120(2.258)* .106(2.021)*  .107(2.055)* 
Risk Sharing  Goal Congruence  .148(2.743)** .152(2.797)** .138(2.667)** .139(2.712)** 
Risk Sharing  Relational Embeddedness  .119(2.271)* .121(2.309)* .104(2.083)* .107(2.137)* 
Resource Sharing  Operation Synchronization .257(4.828)*** .292(5.618)*** .282(5.443)***  .285(5.522)*** 
Resource Sharing  Intelligence Generation .176(3.395)*** .191(3.686)*** .179(3.486)***  .179(3.475)*** 
Resource Sharing  Goal Congruence  -.081(-1.503) -.080(-1.490) -.160(-3.010)** -.163(-3.092)** 
Resource Sharing  Relational Embeddedness  -.026(-.504) -.026(-.507) -.068(-1.338) -.067(-1.318) 
Communication Style  Operation Synchronization .078(1.339) .009(.141) -.013(-.217)  -.029(-.484) 
Communication Style  Intelligence Generation .280(4.812)*** .241(3.818)*** .209(3.320)***  .210(3.381)*** 
Communication Style  Goal Congruence  .301(4.932)*** .308(5.031)*** .241(4.109)*** .240(4.112)*** 
Communication Style  Relational Embeddedness  .307(4.788)*** .311(4.833)*** .262(4.373)*** .264(4.395)*** 
Channel Commitment  Operation Synchronization .213(4.286)*** .168(3.399)*** .150(3.050)**  .143(2.913)** 
Channel Commitment  Intelligence Generation .165(3.390)*** .153(3.053)** .128(2.572)*  .126(2.530) 
Channel Commitment  Goal Congruence  .181(3.575)*** .185(3.632)** .098(1.966)* .096(1.933)† 
Channel Commitment  Relational Embeddedness  .153(3.057)** .153(3.064)** .114(2.345)* .114(2.350)* 
      
Fit Index:      
Chi-Square (X2) 93.437 335.263 324.176 502.597 638.740 
Degree of Freedom (df) 72 179 177 281 374 
X2/df 1.298 1.873 1.832 1.789 1.708 
p-value .046 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Comparative fit index (CFI) .989 .954 .957 .953 .953 
Normed fit index (NFI) .959 .912 .915 .904 .900 
Goodness of fit index (GFI) .979 .941 .943 .927 .916 
Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) .028 .048 .047 .045 .043 
Note:  
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.010; * p < 0.050; † p < 0.100 
Standardized Coefficients are reported with t-value in parathions 
Model 3: Indirect Relationship:  
Social Interaction  Goal Congruence  Operation Synchronization: Sobel Test Statistic = 3.015, p = .002**  
Social Interaction  Goal Congruence  Intelligence Generation: Sobel Test Statistic = .080  
Social Interaction  Relational Embeddedness  Operation Synchronization: Sobel Test Statistic = 1.051 




Figure 2: Graphical Representation: Moderating Effects 








Appendix 1: Measurement and Factor Loading 
Measurement Loading* 
  
Operation Synchronization  
……….. jointly develop demand forecasts .696 
……….. jointly manage inventory .825 
Intelligence Generation  
……….. jointly identify customer needs  .785 
……….. jointly search for and acquire relevant knowledge about market .794 
Social Interaction  
……….. maintain close social relationships .581 
……….. spend a lot of time interacting with each other .825 
Employees in our firm know some employees of our supply chain partners at a personal level .783 
Goal Congruence  
……….. have agreement on the goals of the supply chain .786 
……….. have agreement on the importance of collaboration across the supply chain .832 
……….. have the understanding that by achieving the goals of the supply chain, individual firm’s specific goals will be achieved at the same time. .816 
Relational Embeddedness   
The relationship between ……….. is characterized by mutual respect .475 
The relationship between ……….. is characterized by mutual trust .831 
The relationship between ……….. is characterized by high degree of trade and exchange of favors  .894 
Contractual Governance 
……….. receive clear performance targets and measures and these are well defined in our contracts with them .832 
In our supply chain operation contracts, it is defined in detail when and how new requirements can be implemented and under which conditions .816 
* Factor loadings are standardized 
…….. = Our firms and our supply chain partner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
